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Private Land Use, Changing Public Values,
and Notions of Relativity
Lynda L. Butler*
I. INTRODUCTION

Government regulation of land use is becoming
increasingly more extensive and demanding. Growing scientific
evidence of the link between environmental quality and land
use and greater appreciation of the ecological value of natural
resources have provided much of the impetus for government's
intensified regulatory efforts. Widespread public demand for
environmental quality also appears to have had a positive
effect on government's willingness to regulate land use. For
example, recent opinion polls indicate strong public support for
expanded environmental regulation. 1
The types of land use regulations adopted by government
vary widely in purpose, form, and methodology. Some
regulations impose conditions on otherwise permissible land
uses, while others prohibit uses once allowed by law.2 One
type of land use regulation frequently adopted by localities is
the growth control measure. This type of regulation typically
* Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and ·
Mary. B.S., College of William and Mary, 1973; J.D., University of Virginia, 1978.
This article is based on a paper presented at a conference on "Private
Expectations, Public Promises, and Land Use" held in December 1990 at the
University of Virginia and sponsored by the Institute for Environmental
Negotiation of the University of Virginia. Research for the article was supported by
a grant from the College of William and Mary. The author gratefully acknowledges
the College's support. The author also wishes to acknowledge the assistance of
Della Harris and her word processing staff and to thank Craig Holmes for his
research assistance.
See, e.g., Alliance for the Chesapeake Bay, Survey Finds Support for Bay
1.
Cleanup, Land Use Controls, 1 BAY J., Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 3; Joe Barrett, Poll:
Environment a State Concern, DAILY PRESS (Williamsburg, Va.), May 31, 1990, at
A1; George Gallup, Jr., & Alec Gallup, Many Feel Environmental Fears Unshared,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 12, 1990, at A-10.
See generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 1.02-.10 (2d ed.
2.
1988) (discussing the different types of land use controls).
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restricts or prohibits :future development options of private
landowners and generally represents government's response to
pressing social problems or changing public values. 3 Other
popular forms of land use regulation include aesthetic zoning,
like billboard regulation and historic preservation laws,4 and
environmental controls, like wetlands acts and coastal
development laws adopted to protect critical environmental
resources. 5 'Regardless of the type of land use regulation, the
effect on private landowners generally remains the same:
private landowners, expectations of present and future land use
are restricted, altered, or even defeated.
The reactions of private property owners to expanded land
use regulation are predictable. Private parties who purchase
land in expectation of future development and use are
understandably upset when government interferes with their
expectations. With increasing frequency, these private parties
are challenging land use regulations as impermissible
violations of legally protected property rights. 6 All too often the
challenges fail. Under current law, private landowners
generally are not entitled to legal protection when well-tailored
land use regulations cause a diminution in value, sometimes
not even when the diminution is significant.
As a general matter, a government regulation will
withstand scrutiny under constitutional provisions protecting
property rights as long as the regulation "substantially
advance[s] legitimate state interests" and does not deprive the
property owner of all "economically viable use."7 Sometimes,

See generally id. §§ 1.07, 10.01-.12 (discussing growth controls).
See generally id. §§ 1.06, 11.01-.34 (discussing aesthetic regulation).
5.
See generally id. §§ 12.01-.13 (discussing environmental controls). Some
types of land use controls may fall into more than one category. Wetlands
regulations, for example, may be adopted to control growth as well as to preserve
critical environmental resources.
6.
Most, if not all, of the challenges invoke the protection of the Takings and
Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. The Takings Clause
prohibits government from taldng private property "for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Due Process Clauses protect against
government deprivations of property without due process of law. Id. amends. V,
XIV. For examples of recent challenges, see Lynda L. Butler, State Environmental
Programs: A Study in Political Influence and Regulatory Failure, 31 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 823, 832 n.33, 833 n.3•l (1990).
7.
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). Last term the United
States Supreme Court considered the question of whether a taking results when an
environmental regulation deprives a beachfront landowner of all economically viable
use. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (holding
3.
4.
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when a landowner has relied on a prior land use regulatory
scheme to pursue plans for future use, a court will declare the
landowner's rights to be "vested'' and therefore protected from
government interference under principles of equity.8 But even
this form of protection often is limited to situations involving
good faith reliance by a landowner on government approval of
the landowner's development plans.9
The schism between private expectations and current law
suggests the need to evaluate the legitimacy of those
expectations. Of particular concern is the question of whether
the law should protect private land use expectations from
changes in legal rules, public values, and societal demands.
This article suggests that private expectations do not merit
protection as constitutional property just because a government
regulation has diminished the ability of property owners to
realize their expectations. Government efforts to impose welltailored ecological or other social obligations on private
landowners should, as a general matter, be legitimate under
constitutional and common law property principles so long as
the government action addresses adverse consequences of
private land use and does not deprive landowners of all
economically viable use. Private economic value cannot be the
sole determinant of the legal validity of a government land use
regulation. Other factors, including public preferences and
political and scientific concerns, must play a role in
determining whether private land use expectations merit

that a regulatory taking results upon total deprivation of economically viable use
unless the regulatory action is based on limitations inherent in a landowner's title).
This article does not specifically consider that question, but rather focuses on the
general constitutional legitimacy of changes in laws affecting private property
rights. For further discussion of the recent decision's implications for
constitutionally protected property, see infra notes 145-57 and accompanying text.
8.
See generally 7 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS
§ 52.08[4][b] (1992) (discussing the vested rights doctrine, as well as a related
theory, equitable estoppel). Although court decisions might suggest otherwise, the
vested rights doctrine appears to have a constitutional foundation. See MANDELKER,
supra note 2, § 6.12. For
argument that constitutional analysis should be
applied to the vested rights doctrine and other similar judicial theories developed
to protect property rights, see CHARLES L. SIEMON EI' AL., VESTED RIGHTS 56-68

an

(1982).
9.
See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Medical Structures,· Inc., 192 S.E.2d 799,
801 (Va. 1972). For a discussion of the circumstances under which landowners may

claim equitable estoppel or vested rights to protect their property interests from
changes in land use regulations, see MANDELKER, supra note 2, §§ 6.13-.15; 7
ROHAN, supra note 8, § 52.08[4)[b).
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protection as fundamental property rights. Constitutionally
protected property rights, in other words, should be relative,
varying over time in J:esponse to the totality of facts and
circumstances surroundiing use of resources.
II. PRIVATg LAND USE EXPECTATIONS
Tensions over government land use regulations exist
largely because property owners generally expect to have the
freedom to do what they want with their land. Landowners
typically believe that o·wnership rights include the right to use
their land as they choose, provided such use is consistent with
certain traditional legal principles. Because those principles
generally reflect a laissez-faire approach, typically regulating
land use only to the extent necessary to separate incompatible
uses, 10 landowners have come to expect almost "absolute use"
powers. Though landowners may recognize government's
authority to designate where uses may occur, landowners
generally expect to have the freedom to exploit their land
within the designated area11 and tend to resist government
efforts to impose further use restrictions. Under this "absolute"
or "exploitative use" expectation, then, landowners question
government's power to regulate land use beyond the traditional
use separation format, at least without the payment of just
compensation. 12
Property owners are especially troubled by land use
regulations that have an economic impact. Most, if not all, of
the recently enacted land use regulations fall into this category
because they either impose new restrictions on use or make
those restrictions more stringent. When the legal rules

10.
See gerwrally MANDELRER, supra note 2, §§ 1.03-.10, 5.01 (discussing
traditional and modern zoning techniques).
Cf. Donald W. Large, 'l"'his Land is Whose Land? Changing Concepts of
11.
Land as Property, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 1039, 1042-45 (describing how this view
developed among the early settJ.;rs).
12.
Evidence of the absolute use expectation can be found in the numerous
lawsuits filed by private landowners against government units adopting more
stringent land use restrictions. For some examples of those lawsuits, see Butler,
supra note 6, at 832-34 & nn.33-34, 841-42 & nn.65-66. Evidence also can be found
in numerous newspaper accounta of opposition to government efforts to adopt more
stringent land use regulations. See, e.g., Nathaniel Axtell, Taxpayers to Foot New
Rules on Bay, VA. GAZE'ITE, Sept. 20, 1989, at 5A (where one opponent of a new
environmental law describes tbe law as 'just one more instance of taking an
American freedom away from us" and asks who is "more important, man or the
environment?").
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governing land use are changed after property owners have
purchased their land, the rules will necessarily affect the
owners' expectations. Because private landowners generally
expect to have the freedom to exploit their land, the
landowners typically become outraged when government does
not compensate them for economic loss caused by changes in
use restrictions. 13
Although the law no longer supports the traditional
expectation of absolute use, 14 the law still tolerates and
sometimes even encourages a landowner's exploitative
tendencies. 15 More often than not, for example, landowners
are allowed to develop land and to seek a profit from their
initial land investment. 16 Perhaps because of the law's
tolerance for a landowner's exploitative tendencies, many
landowners continue to believe their expectation of absolute
use merits constitutional protection as a property right.
13.
See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992)
(where a landowner sued because a state law extinguished his property value);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (where a
landowner sued because a· state law diminished the value of his property).
14.
In the early 1900s, the United States Supreme Court recognized the power
of government to modifY, to a certain extent, existing property rights and
expectations. As Justice Holmes explained, "Government hardly could go on if to
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 413 (1922). One important source of traditional support for the exploitative
use expectation can be found in early land distribution laws encouraging settlement
and development. For examples of such laws, see LYNDA L. BUTLER & MARGIT
LIVINGSTON, VmGINIA TIDAL AND COAsrAL LAW ch. 8 (1988).
15.
Just because the law no longer supports the traditional absolute use
expectation, that does not mean the expectation does not exist. In many areas of
the country, for example, the expectation continues to exist because local and state
governments have only recently begun to regulate land use for environmental
purposes. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 6, at 863-65 (discussing recent Chesapeake
Bay legislation). Further, even when environmental land use regulations have been
adopted, they often reflect compromises made to appease op_ponents. See, e.g., id. at
881-83, 885-86 (discussing some exemptions and omissions found in state
environmental legislation). Thus, although the law, as a general matter, does not
affll'lllatively support continued adherence to the traditional absolute use
expectation, the absence of environmentally aggressive regulation has, in many
areas, indirectly encouraged such adherence.
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992)
16.
(deciding that government regulation cannot deprive a landowner of all
economically beneficial use unless the regulation is directed at use interests· not
originally part of the landowner's title); Butler, supra note 6, at 875-77, 890-91,
909-10, 923-25. But see Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 769-70 (Wis.
1972) (upholding a shoreland zoning ordinance which prevented affected landowners
from changing the natural character of land located in certain areas without a
special permit).
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The Supreme Court's opinion in the 1992 decision Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council 17 provides clear evidence of
the law's continuing support for a landowner's exploitative
tendencies. In Lucas, the Court concluded that a regulation
denying a landowner "all economically beneficial or productive
use" merited categorical treatment as a taking and did not
require a "case-specific inquiry into the public interest
advanced in support" of the regulation. 18 The only way the
regulation could "resist compensation" would be if an "inquiry
into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed
use interests" were not originally part of the landowner's
title; 19 that is, the regulatory action must be based on
limitations inherent in the landowner's title or in ''background
principles" of property or nuisance law.20 In explaining the
Court's categorical treatment of regulations that deny all
economically viable use, Justice Scalia relied in part on Coke's
query: " '[F]or what is the land but the profits thereofi?]' '.'21
'Vhen Justice Stevens criticized Justice Scalia for assuming
"that the only uses of property cognizable under the
Constitution are developmental uses,"22 Justice Scalia denied
making such an assumption. He explained that "[t]hough our
prior takings cases evince an abiding concern for the productive
use of, and economic investment in, land, there are plainly a
number of noneconomic interests in land whose impairment
vrul invite exceedingly close scrutiny under the Takings
Clause."23 Af3 an example, he cited a case protecting the right
to exclude. 24
Justice Scalia's response does not adequately rebut Justice
Stevens's argument. In Justice Scalia's own words, the Court is
concluding that a landowner who ''has been called upon ... to
leave his property economically idle . . . has suffered a
taking."25 Furthermore, the only noneconomic interest that
Justice Scalia identifies is the right to exclude. Although that
17.
18.
19.

112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
Id. at 2893.
Id. at 2899.
20.
Id. at 2900.
21.
ld. at 2894 (quoting 1 Sm EDWARD COKE, INSI'ITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND ch. 1, § 1 (1st Am. ed. 1812)).
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2919 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22.
23.
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8.
24.
Id. (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
436 (1982)).
Id. at 2895.
25.
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right is noneconomic in the sense that the right does not focus
on any particular use or economic interest, the right to exclude
is central to a landowner's power to decide how and when to
use his property.26 By protecting the right to exdude, the
Court is protecting a property owner's power to take economic
gambles. More often than not, the property owner decides to
exercise that power. Thus, notwithstanding Justice Scalia's
protests, the decision in Lucas reveals a philosophic approach
to property that is strongly tied to traditional views.
Whether a landowner's expectations of profit and
exploitation deserve protection as property rights depends in
large part on the reasonableness of the expectations. Long ago,
philosopher Jeremy Bentham defined property as "nothing but
a basis of expectation" founded on the. law-an "established"
expectation of gain derived from and made predictable and
secure by the law.27 The legal system has incorporated
Bentham's notion of established expectations into basic
concepts of property. Among other factors, traditional case law
focuses on the reasonableness of expectations in determining
whether property rights have been violated by private or
government action.28 The Court's recent decision in Lucas
appears to elevate, or at least reinvigorate, the role of
reasonable expectations in takings jurisprudence. Justice Scalia
explains that the Court's takings jurisprudence "has
traditionally been guided by the understandings of our citizens
regarding the content of, and the State's power over, the
'bundle of rights' that they acquire when they obtain title to
property."29 In Justice Scalia's view, government action

26.
See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONO~fiC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.1 (3d
ed. 1986) (discussing exclusivity and the other key attributes of property).
27.
JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111-13 (lOth ed. 1896).
28.
Traditional common law principles governing water use in the East, for
example, include a reasonable use standard to resolve conflicts among users. See
generally Lynda L. Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a Riparian
Jurisdiction: Defining the Relationship Between Public and Private Interests, 47 U.
PITT. L. REV. 95, 125-37 (1985) (discussing the reasonable use standard).
Additionally, one of the factors considered by the Supreme Court in determining
whether government has impermissibly taken private property iJ the
reasonableness of investment-backed expectations. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
For further discussion of the role of Bentham in defining common law and
constitutional property, see Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1165, 1211-13 (1967).
29.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992).
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depriving a landowner of all economically valuable use is
"inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in the
Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional
culture."30 This language reveals how closely property and
takings law are bound up with the reasonable expectations of
landowners.
Evaluating the reasonableness of private land use
expectations requires a better understanding of the sources of
those expectations. On.ce the origins of the absolute use
expectation are identified, the legitimacy of private
expectations can then be examined. Expectations based on
invalid or obsolete facts and circumstances require close
scrutiny. As the following discussion suggests, this evaluation
process necessarily must involve consideration of competing
third party or public values.

A. Origins of Private Land Use Expectations
Over the years, numerous cultural, legal, and political
factors have shaped attitudes about property rights, skewing
perceptions about resource use and management in favor of
private rights and expectations. This influence is especially
apparent in the area of land use regulation. Government administrators, legislators, and jurists routinely demonstrate a
private rights orientation, often erring on the side of private
land use expectations in weighing government options for regulation. 31 To this day, people from all walks of life still believe
in the sanctity of private land ownership and assume that
landowners have virtually absolute rights of use and control.32
Natural use and undeveloped land, in other words, are rarely
viewed as normal either in our property system or in our society.3a
One cultural factor that has contributed to the development of our private rights orientation, especially our exploitative tendencies, is the early American bias against the wilderness. Known as the "pioneer tradition," this cultural bias

Id. at 2900.
Legislators, for example, often include broad exemptions in environmental
laws affecting landowners, see Butler, supra note 6, at 881-83, 885-86, while courts
tend to interpret those laws from a traditional private property perspective, see id.
at 896-97.
32.
See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
33.
:30.

:n.
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evolved from the belief that wilderness needed to be developed
and conquered to ensure man's physical and moral survival.34
Although American society no longer adheres to this belief, the
cultural bias against wilderness has, by now, become firmly
engrained in the concept of private property. 35
A tradition of private land management has further contributed to the private rights bias. During the colonial and
early statehood periods, this tradition appears to have existed
in several American jurisdictions. In Virginia and New York,
for example, early systems of land distribution resulted in the
concentration of landholdings in the hands of relatively few
people.36 The owners of these landholdings often decided to
leave their holdings undeveloped for long periods of time.37
Although resource protection did not necessarily motivate these
decisions, it was, at the very least, an incidental benefit.38 Today landowners have become too numerous and resource management problems too complex for the tradition of private resource protection to be effective in most contexts.
Legal and political factors have also contributed to the
development of the private rights orientation, including the
exploitative use expectation.39 The prominence of private

34.
RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 24, 239 (3d ed.
1982). As Nash explained:
Two components figured in the American pioneer's bias against wilderness. On the direct, physical level, it constituted a· formidable threat to
his very survival . . . . Safety and comfort, even necessities like food and
shelter, depended on overcoming the wild environment . . . . The pioneer,
in short, lived too close to wilderness for appreciation. Understandably,
his attitude was hostile and his dominant criteria utilitarian. The conquest of wilderness was his major concern.
Wilderness not only frustrated the pioneers physically but also acquired significance as a dark and sinister symbol. They shared the long
Western tradition of imagining wild country as a moral vacuum, a cursed
and chaotic wasteland. As a consequence, frontiersmen acutely sensed that
they battled wild country not only for personal survival but in the name
of nation, race, and God.
Id. at 24. Others have referred to this cultural bias as the "cowboy mentality" or
"cowboy economy." See Large, supra note 11, at 1043-44 & n.22.
35.
Butler, supra note 6, at 839 & n.58.
Id. at 839 n.59.
36.
37.
Lax enforcement of settlement and development conditions imposed on colonial land grants encouraged this practice. See generally BUTLER & LMNGSTON,
supra note 14, § 8.1 (discussing colonial land distribution in Virginia). Eventually
state land distribution acts allowed land to be held absolutely and unconditionally.
See, e.g., id. § 8.3, at 279.
38.
Butler, supra note 6, at 839 n.59.
39.
Another factor that sustains the private rights perspective is the reluctance
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property in our Constitution has played a significant role in
this development process. Besides prohibiting government deprivations of property without due process of law,40 the Constitution also prevents government from taking private property for public use without payment of just compensation.41
Some scholars have arb:rued that the Takings Clause represents
a victory for the Madisonian political camp,42 which viewed
property rights as "inviolabl[e]" and called for an individual
rights approach to constitutional interpretation.43
Even if this view is not correct, it is nevertheless clear that
the Due Process and Takings Clauses of the Constitution recognize the fundamental importance of the private property concept. As Charles Reich once stated in a now famous description
of the relationship between property and civil liberties, the
freedoms recognized in the Bill of Rights "must have a basis in
property," or they will not be preserved.44 ''Political rights presuppose that individuals and private groups have the will and
the means to act independently.'J4 5 Property thus serves the
important function of maintaining a person's independence by
drawing a "zone of privacy'' around the individual.46 Within
that zone, the individual is "master" and the majority must
"yield to the owner."'17 Given the constitutional stature of

of nonlegislative bodies to alter fundamental legal and political rights such as
property rights. This reluctance prevents quick changes in property rights. See
generally Butler, supra note 6,. at 854-60 (discussing the political question doctrine
as a legal obstacle to judicial activism).
40.
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
41.
Id. amend. V.
42.
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN at x, 15-1~' (1985) (discussing the political philosophy of the
takings clause); see also Jerry L. Anderson, Takings and Expectations: Toward a
''Broader Vision" of Property Rights, 37 KAN. L. REV. 529, 536 (1989) (discussing
the modern federalist view).
43.
James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZE'ITE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted zn 14
JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAHES MADISON 266-68 (Robert Rutland et al.
eds., 1983); see also Anderson, supra note 42, at 534. For a thoughtful discussion
of the importance of the Madisonian preoccupation with property to American
constitutionalism, see JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990). For discussion and interpretation of the main
opposing view, the Jeffersonian or social good view, see RICHARD K. MATI'HEWS,
THE RADICAL POLITICS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (1984); GARRE'IT W. SHELDON, THE
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (1991); Anderson, supra note 42, at
531-33; infra text accompanying note 101.
44.
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964).
45.
Id.
46.
Id. at 778.
47.
Id. at 771.
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property, the development of a private rights bias and an absolute use expectation is not at all surprising.
The traditional common law system also has encouraged
the development of the absolute use expectation. During the
era of "liberty of contract," the judiciary generally protected
private contractual arrangements from government interference. Eventually, as the concept of "freedom of contract" became well accepted, private parties came to expect the same
freedom for land transactions.48 Additionally, after the American Revolution, states allowed individual landowners to hold
their property interests free of most if not all of the affirmative
obligations that traditionally were owed to a grantor simply
because of that party's prior interest.49 Together with the development of freedom of contract, this land reform helped foster
the view that land was a commodity to be bought or sold in the
marketplace just like any other economic asset.50
Long-standing land use practices have further reinforced
the exploitative view of private landowners. Until fairly recently, many localities had engaged in little, if any, land use regulation.51 Furthermore, even when localities adopted land use
regulations, the localities generally focused on use separation,
and not on use restriction.52 This tradition of minimal land
use regulation has created the false expectation in landowners
that government will not significantly increase the burdens of
land use regulation-at least not without payment of just compensation.53
48.
See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 27579, 412-14, 532-36 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing the development of contracts and land
law); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
160-210 (1977) (discussing the development of contracts law).
49.
Butler, supra note 6, at 841 & n.62. Although some states apparently still
. retain the tenure concept, there now is little, if any, practical difference between
states that have not affirmatively abolished the last vestiges of tenure and those
that have. See CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 9 (2d ed. 1988). See generally 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 229406 (2d ed. 1959) (discussing the feudal land system).
50.
Butler, supra note 6, at 841 & n.63.
See, e.g., id. at 875-77, 923-24 (discussing problems with local government
51.
regulation in Virginia).
52.
See generally MANDELKER, supra note 2, §§ 1.03-.10, 5.01 (discussing traditional and modern zoning techniques).
53.
The Supreme Court's decision in Lucas u. South Carolina Coastal Council
clarifies that compensation is generally owed if government increases the burden of
land use regulation to the point of eliminating all economically viable use. 112 S.
Ct. 2886, 2895, 2899-900, 2901-02 (1992). To avoid compensation in such a situa-
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Although the traditional view of property may be understandable from a cultural, legal, and political perspective, it
represents an incomplete and biased view of the concept of
property. Among other problems, the traditional view has an
unnecessarily narrow and one-sided focus, ignoring important
economic and noneconomic values. Given the ecological interrelatedness of natural resources, this one-dimensional perspective
makes no sense. As the following discussion explains, legitimate private use expectations must be grounded in a more
holistic view of land use.

B. The Need for a Holistic View of Land Use
The private expectation of absolute use has one serious
flaw: it adopts a narrow view of the world, ignoring a number
of factors critical to the resource allocation process. This limited perspective has two related but distinct effects on the allocation process. First, the narrow view artificially constrains the
content of the value sy.stem used to allocate property interests.
Under the exploitative view of property, this value system
focuses almost exclusively on concerns important to individual
landowners. Though a landowner's concerns might implicate a
variety of values ranging from economic to moral, the values
are primarily defined from the perspective and self-interests of
the landowner. Second, the narrow view tends to unnecessarily
limit the scope of land. use decisions to the interaction of the
individual landowner with the challenged regulation. Although
the public interest generally is considered in the land use planning process,54 many significant land use decisions actually
are made in the context of an individual landowner's challenge
to a particular regulation. Because of the dispute-oriented nature of our judicial process, land use decisions developed
through the judicial process tend to exclude from consideration
the relationship between the private landowner and the public
at large, as well as the relationship between the private landowner and other property owners.55 This one-dimensional pertion, government must establish that the land use regulation "inhere[s] in the title
itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the . . . law of property and
nuisance already place upon land ownership." Id. at 2900.
54.
See generally MANDELKER, supra note 2, §§ 3.01-.24 (discussing the land use
planning process).
See infra notes 69-72 ~md accompanying text. Third parties, such as neigh55.
boring property owners and citizens, must establish standing to challenge land use
regulations. See MANDELKER, supra note 2, § 8.02. Many state courts require third
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spective thus ignores the interrelatedness of land and other
natural resources and of users and nonusers.
Both problems can be demonstrated by a cursory examination of the economic values underlying the exploitative view.
Private landowners adopting such a view will often reluctantly
accept environmental regulations, like pollution controls, if the
costs of complying with the regulations can be passed on to the
public through some sort of price adjustment in the marketplace. These landowners will contest, nonetheless, other environmental regulations, like many wetlands use restrictions,
because the costs of compliance cannot be similarly recouped. 56 This approach basically relegates the question of the
legal validity of land use regulations to the status of an individual business decision; under the absolutist view of property, the
validity question is addressed primarily from the economic
perspective of the individual landowner, and other relevant
values are generally ignored.
The absolutist view, for example, ignores the values of
third parties who prefer environmentally sound land use even
when a private landowner cannot pass on the costs of achieving
such land use. Those opposing aggressive land use regulations
often respond to this concern by stressing that, if the value of
the public preference for environmentally sound land use is
high enough, the public can buy out the landowner's use
right. 57 This response ignores serious externality problems
parties to establish " 'special' damage to an interest or property right that is different from the damage the general public suffers from a zoning restriction." Id. §
8.02, at 317. As a general matter, state courts conclude that special damage "occurs only to property that is close enough to be affected." Id. § 8.04, at 319. Fear
of harmful effects often is not sufficient to confer standing. Id. at 318-19. See generally id. §§ 8.01-.07 (discussing third-party standing in state court). Although the
trend has been to grant standing to organizations on the basis of environmental
injury, id. § 8.06, recent Supreme Court opinions suggest that environmental
groups will have a difficult time establishing injury. See Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (holding that environmental groups lacked standing, even though members had a cognizable interest in preserving endangered
species, because members did not show actual and imminent injury); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (denying standing to a group whose
members claimed recreational and aesthetic enjoyment of land in the vicinity of
land affected by agency actions because evidence was insufficient to establish that
members' interests were actually affected).
56.
Wetlands regulations typically control the size, location, and diversity of
land uses, making it difficult for a landowner to pass on the costs of compliance as
a use cost. See, e.g., MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1807(a), -1808(b), (d) (1990)
(establishing a 1000-foot buffer zone around Chesapeake Bay waters for special
environmental regulation).
57.
See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894-95
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existing in the environmental and land use area.58 An
externality is a "cost or benefit that the voluntary actions of
one or more people imposes or confers on a third party or parties without their consent."59 In the environmental and land
use context, externality problems arise in part because public
preferences are too diffused and small for the public's needs to
be met through marketplace transactions. No single member of
the public typically has enough of an interest to prompt that
person to act on the public's collective preference. Furthermore,
even when someone has a strong interest, that person often
prefers not to seek legal protection of the interest because of
the free benefits other members of the public would receive
from the action. 60
Private landowners can claim, in response to this argument, that if an individual landowner has to bear the costs of
ensuring environmentally sensitive land use, third parties who
(1992); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills,
193 A.2d 232, 240 (N.J. 1963); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767-68,
770-71 (Wis. 1972).
58.
Although the existence of market problems in the environmental area is
generally not disputed, schol11rs disagree about the moral, economic, and political
implications of these problems. Compare Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and En·
forcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. & ECON. 11, 19-20 (1964) (arguing that efficiency concerns justify a private rights approach in most market failure situations)
with Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custam, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986) (arguing for an expanded public
rights approach to the market failure problem). See generally FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOl\fiC INCENTIVES 3-6, 2128 (1977) (discussing market failure in the environmental context and suggesting a
pricing approach); A. MYRICK FREEMAN ET AL., THE ECONOl\fiCS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POUcY (1973) (discussing the economic implications of the market failure problem);
DAVID W. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 4-22 (1990) (discussing different economic schools and models of
environmental management); Mark Sagoff~ Economic Theory and Environmental
Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393 (1981) (criticizing economic analysis of environmental
problems and arguing for a broader perspective on environmental regulation). This
scholarly debate seems to have had little effect on private land use expectations.
General scholarly agreement about the existence of a market failure in the environmental area, for example, has not prevented private landowners from becoming
upset with land use restrictions designed to correct the failure. Even when landowners recognize the external environmental costs of private land use, they often
resist regulation because of the economic impact on private rights and the public
benefits resulting from regulation. For further discussion of the constitutional implications of these two factors, Bee infra notes 146-57 and accompanying text.
59.
ROBER!' COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOl\fiCS 45 (1988).
60.
See ANDERSON El' AL., supra note 58, at 26-27 (discussing some of the reasons for externalities in the environmental context); Joseph L. Sax, Why We Will
Not (Should Not) Sell the Public Lands: Changing Conceptions of Private Property,
1983 UTAH L. REV. 313, 322-23 (discussing externalities involving public values).
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prefer such use would be freeriding on the landowner. Although
some scholars have supported this argument,61 it still does not
adequately account for the significant marketplace problems
facing members of the public who prefer environmentally sound
land use. 62 In addition, the landowners' response in effect ignores the external costs of private land use-that is, the costs
to third parties of private land use decisions. Because the marketplace traditionally does not account for environmental preferences, private landowners do not have any incentive to minimize the environmental costs of their land use choices through
self-restraint; third parties already bear those costs involuntarily.sa
As the formal representative of the public at large, government admittedly can overcome some externality problems by
exercising its power of eminent domain to force an exchange of
a private landowner's use rights for just compensation. However, this solution will occur only when government decides to
recognize and promote the public preference. Additionally, the
eminent domain solution ignores the external costs imposed by
private landowners on third parties generally.64 As the extensiveness and the seriousness of these costs become more apparent, a growing number of people are resisting the proposition
that government must pay landowners to minimize their external land use costs. 65
Although it may not be desirable to force private landowners to consider all the costs of land use decisions, the appropriate economic solution should not allow private landowners to
totally ignore the external costs of their use. Such a unilateral
and one-dimensional solution should not be allowed-at least
not when the marketplace fails to account for the preferences of

61.
Cf, Demsetz, supra note 58, at 19-20 (arguing for the exclusion of freeriders
through a private rights approach in many public goods situations).
62.
For additional marketplace problems, see infra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 124463.
45 (1968) (discussing the serious consequences of externalities).
64.
The Eminent Domain Clause is also known as the Takings or Just Compensation Clause. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. In determining just
compensation, courts only focus on the value of the "taken" property. See 4 Juuus
L. SACKMAN & PATRICK J. ROHAN, NICHOlS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.01 (3d ed.
1990).
65.
The increasing aggressiveness of state legislatures in regulating land uses
that destroy or injure critical environmental resources demonstrates this point. See
generally Butler, supra note 6 (discussing state environmental programs).
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a significant number of people and when private economic
choices have serious or high external costs. Though an effective
environmental program will significantly benefit the public,
government's decision to adopt the program cannot and should
not be compared to normal marketplace choices.
In contrast to the typical voluntary marketplace transaction, government's decision to adopt environmental land use
regulations is, for all practical purposes, involuntary. Government is forced into adopting the regulations because of the
serious external costs of private land use; in ecological terms,
government must engage in extensive land use regulation to
avert the tragedy of the commons. 66 Government must attempt to force private parties to internalize land use costs
when land use has a detrimental and long-term effect on third
parties and on the health of remaining natural resources. The
mere status of being a landowner should not be the sole determinant of the content of the economic values used to allocate
costs and benefits between private landowners and third parties.67
The artificially constrained value system and one-dimensional perspective of the private rights approach to property is
somewhat understandable given the historical development of
property law and, more specifically, of land use law. The courts
traditionally have defined the scope and meaning of private
property rights. 68 The focus of a court is inherently limited to
the dispute raised by the parties before it.69 In the context of
land use regulations, such a dispute typically involves the government regulator and the individual landowner challenging
the regulation. Although the courts can, in the context of the
particular dispute, consider public policies implicated by the

66.
The tragedy of the commons refers to the ecological roin that results when
resources are available for common use without regard for the costs of use. For a
discussion of the tr~gedy of fo.e commons, see Hardin, supra note 63.
Of course, the mere status of being a landowner does carry significant legal
67.
implications, including constitutional consequences. For further discussion of some
of those consequences, see infra notes 99-117, 129-57 and accompanying text.
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2903 (1992)
68.
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining how property can tend "to become what courts
say it is"); ROGER A. CUNNlNGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 1.3, 1.5
(1984) (discussing the common law basis of American property law). See generally
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) (discussing
the processes by which judges decide cases).
For a discussion of the role of the courts in the environmental context, see
69.
Butler, supra note 6, at 854-60, 893-906.
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dispute, 70 many courts are reluctant to assume the role of actively defining and developing public policy. 71 In the view of
these jurists, public policymaking is a task more comfortably
left to democratically responsive government officials. In addition to ensuring that a politically acceptable policy choice is
made, these officials are, in the opinion of some, better able to
develop comprehensive solutions to complex resource management problems. 72
Furthermore, until fairly recently, public and private interests in land use overlapped significantly. Because of this
country's historical abundance of land and because of its ongoing need for economic growth, land use laws traditionally encouraged private settlement and use. 73 For many years, the
public interest focused, like the private interest, on the settlement, cultivation, and development of land. This congruence
between public and private interests encouraged the development of a false definition of property-a definition which
equates private property with economic development and which
results in the subordination of inconsistent public interests to
private economic values. The close congruence between public
land policy and private land rights has generally ceased to
exist, largely because the conditions supporting unfettered
development have vanished. Vast acres of undeveloped land
and a sparse population have given way to a dwindling supply
of land and overcrowded urban _areas. 74 Thus, instead of promoting unfettered development, public land policy generally
now seeks to control growth and manage the remaining undeveloped land. 75 Despite this change in public land policy, the
legacy of the traditional approach remains; many landowners
. still view their property rights as tantamount to economic free
70.
See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971) (where the court considers the privacy interests of migrant workers, as well as their access to government services, in interpreting and limiting the private property rights of their
employer).
See, e.g., Butler, supra note 6, at 848-54, 893-904 (discussing the restrictive
71.
approach of some state courts).
For further discussion of these views, see id. at 854-60, 893-906.
72.
73.
See, e.g., BUTLER & LMNGSTON, supra note 14, ch. 8 (discussing land grant
laws enacted during Virginia's colonial and early statehood periods).
See WILWM OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY 8-9 (1977)
74.
(discussing the growing problem of ecological scarcity); Large, supra note 11, at
1041-45 (discussing changing resource conditions).
See 1 GEORGE C. COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RE75.
SOURCES LAW § 1.02[3] (1990 & Release #3, 1992) (discussing modem public natural resources law).
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will and thus consider their rights to be superior to most public
interests that are inconsistent with the exercise of that free
will.76

The present limitations of the traditional view of property
suggest the need to redefine private land use expectations and
ground them in a more holistic view of land use. 77 Under this
holistic view, the relationship between private landowners and
third parties would be e:ntitled to consideration in resolving disputes over a particular owner's land use. A decisionmaker
would no longer feel compelled to ignore the interrelatedness of
individual tracts of land and other resources and of users and
nonusers. The decisionrr1aker also would recognize that many of
the bases for the private expectation of exploitative use developed in the context of facts and circumstances that no longer
exist. Those courts reluctant to expand the dispute before them
to consider third party values and interests would need to rethink the nature of the common law, especially its inherent
:t1exibility/8 and to identify concepts of common law property
that capture that flexibility.
Although this article does not purport to develop a comprehensive solution to the problems and issues raised above, it
does offer some thoughts on how to begin the process of redefining private land use expectations and resolving the tensions
between private property rights and changing land use laws. 79

76.
See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
77.
At least two members of the current Supreme Court appear to recognize
the need for a holistic approach to defming private land use expectations. In his
concurring opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, Justice Kennedy
deplores the Court for using "too narrow a confme for the exercise of regulatory
power in a complex and interdependent society." 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2903 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). In his view, the "State should not be prevented from
enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions, and courts
must consider all reasonable expectations whatever their source." Id. Coastal
property, for example, "may present such unique concerns for a fragile land system
that the State can go further in regulating its development and use than the common law of nuisance might otherwise permit." Id. Justice Stevens also criticizes the
Court's approach as "too narrow" and "too rigid." Id. at 2918 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He explains that the Court's holding "effectively freezes the State's common
law," id. at 2921~ and ignores the "evolving" nature of property rights, id. at 2922.
In his view, the Court improperly assumed that "the only uses of property cognizable under the Constitution are developmental uses." Id. at 2919 n.3.
78.
See CARDOZO, supra note 68, at 22-25 (discussing the flexible and evolving
nature of the common law).
79.
Among other concerns, this process will require consideration of the following questions: To what extent do existing rules of law generate reasonable expectations that merit protection by the legal system? What effect should changing re-
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At the core of these thoughts is the common law concept of
relativity-the notion that property rights are relative and
therefore vary in relation to the facts, circumstances, and interests implicated by a resource decision. Applying the relativity
concept in the context of land use regulation will necessarily
require recognition of public interests in privately owned land.

III. PUBLIC VALUES AND
REASONABLE LAND USE EXPECTATIONS
Private land use decisions impact the public in a variety of
ways. Some members of the public may own property that is
adversely affected by a neighbor's land use. Filling in one
owner's wetlands, for example, can result in. the flooding of
neighboring lands and in the depositing of sediment on those
lands. 80 Other members of the public may suffer more indirect
effects. Though these third parties cannot point to any specific
private property interest that is adversely affected, they nevertheless can demonstrate injury to their health, to a common
resource, or more generally to the environment. The <;letrimental effects of industrial land use, for instance, are well documented and include short- and long-term threats to the public
health, to air and water, and to the ecology of the affected
area. 81 Furthermore, a land use does not have to involve industrial processes to have a significant effect on the public at
large. Even modest residential development in a historically
important or environmentally sensitive area, for instance, can
permanently destroy the historical value of the area or cause
irreversible ecological damage.82 Uncontrolled residential development can also overtax the infrastructure of an area,
straining community resources like roads and police or fire protection.

source conditions and new scientific knowledge have on private land rights? Should
private landowners bear, as an incident of their ownership rights, a social obligation to exercise their rights in a way that minimizes, or at least considers, the
costs to third parties?
80.
See generally NATIONAL WETLANDS POLICY FORUM, PROTECTING AMERICA'S
WETLANDS: AN ACTION AGENDA 9-15 (1988) (discussing the functions of wetlands
and the effects of alterations).
81.
See, e.g., U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALTI'Y, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 29-42
(1970) (discussing the sources and effects of water pollution).
See, e.g., LoWER JAMES RIVER Ass'N, RoUTE 5: A VIRGINIA BYwAY (1990)
82.
(discussing ways to protect historic Route 5 from modern growth and development).
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By recognizing the legitimacy of at least some of these
third party interests, the law would be correcting some of the
economic, political, and ecological failures of the private property system.83 Even under an effective economic and political
structure, imperfections in the process for expressing private
and public preferences· will arise. To the extent that significant
imperfections are identified, some effort should be made to
correct them. Though the Constitution protects property rights
from arbitrary government deprivations, uncompensated confiscations for public use, and unlimited regulation in the public
interest, the Constitution does not prevent government from
readjusting the private property system to accommodate both
private and public inte:rests in valuable or vital resources.84

A. Recognizing the Public Interest in Private Land Use
When viewed in light of the need for a holistic approach,
land use laws serve an important corrective function: reallocating land use rights to account for third party interests ignored
by the traditional private property system. This corrective
function can be justified from an economic, political, and ecological perspective. Though a detailed discussion of each perspective is beyond the scope of this article, a more limited discussion suggests the importance of the corrective function in the
private land use context. By evaluating traditional land use expectations under each perspective, significant weaknesses of
the traditional approach are highlighted, their adverse effects
on third party or public interests are demonstrated, and the
case for recognizing the public interest in private land use is
thus advanced.
1. Economic perspectives
In addition to the externality problems mentioned earlier,85 other economic problems surround the absolute use ex-

83.
Though moral failures may also exist, this article does not attempt to explore moral bases for private land use regulation. For one scholar's efforts . to define
the ethical or moral bases of environmental regulation, see Mark Sagoff, Where
Ickes Went Right or Reason and Rationality in Environmental Law, 14 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 265 (1987) [hereinafter Sagoff, Reason and Rationality], and Sagoff, supra note
58.
For further discussion of constitutionally protected property rights, see infra
84.
notes 99-117, 129-57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
85.
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pectation of the traditional property system. High transaction
costs and inefficient land value discounting, for example, can be
associated with the exploitative approach to private land use.
Without government land use regulation, private landowners
generally would not be able to control their neighbors' land
uses. Although private nuisance actions would provide some
relief, these actions generally would not be effective against an
offending land use having a widespread effect.86 A private
landowner would hesitate to bring such an action when other
landowners would benefit from a successful lawsuit without
paying for any of its costs. Furthermore, if a private landowner
tried instead to form an association of landowners to deal with
the problem, the landowner would face formidable transaction
costs-that is, the costs of transacting with the numerous landowners in the affected area and ultimately with the offending
landowner. 87 In a world without land use regulation, a private
landowner would want to discount the value of the expected
gain from a possible land use to reflect the probability that the
gain will be less because of the uses of neighboring landowners.
This discounting might, in turn, cause the landowner to choose
a less efficient land use option.88 Thus, even a purely private
perspective suggests the need to limit private ownership rights
by land use regulation.
The traditional view of land as an economic resource is
also problematic.89 Although interests in land can, like other
property interests, be bought or sold in the marketplace, land
differs from typical marketplace goods in ways that justify
recognition of a stronger public interest. Besides being
nonmovable and fixed in supply, land also is an important
86.
See James E. Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions: A Conceptual Overview, 18 UCLA L. REV. 429, 443-59 (1971) (discussing some of the
limitations of a judicial approach to pollution control). See generally MANDELKER,
supra note 2, §§ 4.02-.15 (discussing judicial zoning through nuisance actions). For
an article arguing that a more privatized and less centralized system of land use
control is superior to zoning in promoting efficiency and equity, see Robert C.
Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land
Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973).
For further discussion of the free rider and transaction costs problems, see
87.
Krier, supra note 86, at 443-49.
For an example of such discounting, see POSNER, supra note 26, § 3.1, at
88.
32. But cf. Ellickson, supra note 86 (arguing that a privatized system of land use
control is superior to zoning in promoting efficiency).
89.
Although the shortcomings of this traditional view are well accepted,
scholars still debate the implications of those shortcomings. Furthermore, the view
still appears to be -prevalent among private landowners. See supra note 58.
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source of life. In addition, the land valuation process poses
significant problems. Exaggerated land prices often result from
the land valuation process because land is not fungible and
must therefore be valued through a practice of community extrapolation; that is, land values generally are set by looking at
the market prices of comparable tracts of land in the community.90 Overinflated land values also may occur because private
parties speculate about the development potential of a tract of
land and ignore its existence value.91 Because property law
has traditionally protected the reasonable expectations of landowners92 and because the existence value of land reflects fragile ecological values for which there is no established market, 93 marketplace transactions have generally failed to reflect
the full value of preserving land in its natural state. Finally,
the traditional view of land as an economic resource is based
on an assumption of abundance that is no longer valid. While
the discovery of North America and the rest of the New World
may have temporarily justified this assumption, tremendous
growth and development over hundreds of years have made the
fmiteness of land and other natural resources painfully
clear. 94
For a variety of economic reasons, then, the traditional use
expectations of private landowners fail to promote the protection of common resources available for public use either because private rights cannot be effectively recognized or because
the resources are vital to the public's survival and well-being.
Unless private landowners are forced to consider the third
party costs of their land use decisions, the landowners have no
incentive to protect common resources affected by their uses.
Af3 Hardin explained in. his famous article The Tragedy of the
Commons, individual users of common resources will not exercise self-restraint to restrict their own use if others do not take
similar action; nor will they voluntarily incur costs to preserve
the commons. No single user would be willing to pursue such
management and preservation efforts without guarantees of

90.
See John A. Hum.bach, Law and a New Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REV. 339,
362 n.74 (1989).
For a discussion of the development and existing-use components of land
91.
market values, see id. at 362-69, and Large, supra note 11, at 1078-81.
92.
See supra notes 14-30 and accompanying text.
93.
See Large, supra note 11, at 1080-81.
94.
See OPHULS, supra note 74, ·at 8-9.
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reciprocal action by other commoners who would benefit from
the efforts.95
By imposing a legal obligation on private landowners to
cooperate in preserving common resources, the law would be
following some basic principles of economics.96 Under the economic perspectives discussed above, this obligation would require landowners to recognize the legitimacy and significance of
the public interest in preserving common resources-at least to
the extent necessary to avert the tragedy of the commons. Recognition of the public interest would, in turn, mean accepting
reasonable land use restrictions designed to internalize private
land use costs, minimize inefficient land value discounting, and
readjust land use practices to reflect present resource conditions and existence and other environmental values. 97 As a
general matter, landowners bearing this duty to cooperate
should not be able to successfully raise takings challenges to
well-tailored and broad-based restrictions when the restrictions
leave the landowner with economically viable use and help to
preserve common resources that are available for public use
either because of the impracticality of recognizing private
rights or because of the importance of the resources to the
public's survival and well-being. 98

2. Political theory perspectives
Political theory problems also surround the traditional use
expectations of private landowners. Although these expectations find some support in the prominence of property rights in
the Constitution,99 the traditional expectations of exploitation

95.
Hardin, supra note 63, at 1244-45.
96.
See generally COOTER & ULEN, supra note 59, at 92-108 (discussing the
benefits of cooperation). For an argument for compelled cooperation, see Charles H.
Koch Jr., Cooperative Surplus: The Effzciency Justification for Active Government,
31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 431 (1990). Although recognition of private property
rights is the solution generally advanced to avert the tragedy of the commons, this
solution will not work for the special category of common resources identified
above-that is, resources available for public use because private rights cannot
effectively be recognized or because the resources are vital to the public's wellbeing. Indeed, private users are a principal reason for the deterioration of this
category of common resources. See Hardin, supra note 63, at 1245.
97.
For a discussion of existence value and of environmental valuation generally, see PEARCE & TURNER, supra note 58, at 120-58, 320-41.
98.
For further discussion of the takings implications of land use restrictions,
see infra notes 145-57 and accompanying text.
99.
See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
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and absolute use define the concept of constitutionally protected property in a way that is inaccurate and unnecessarily restrictive under political theory perspectives. No single political
view should control the definition of key fundamental rights
absent clear evidence to the contrary. Such an approach is
dangerous because, among other reasons, it places tremendous
power in the hands of the decisionmaker who chooses the controlling political viewpoint.
At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, at least two
political camps played crucial roles. One camp, the
Madisonians or federalists, basically believed in the fundamental importance of individual rights like private property ownership. Fearing government abuse of individuals, Madisonians
urged the adoption of a strong individual rights approach to
constitutional interpretation. 100 A second camp, the Jeffersonians or republicans, also believed in the importance of property and other individual rights, but had less fear of collective action. The Jeffersonians thus placed a higher premium on promoting the collective interest and believed that property rights
were held subject to the greater social good. 101 Though the
Takings Clause was the product of the Madisonian camp, 102
the inclusion of the clause in the Constitution cannot-and
shoUld not-be interpreted as a total vindication of the
Madisonian political view. The drafting and adoption of the
Constitution required numerous political compromises, some of
which meant modification or rejection of Madisonian ideals.103 Although the Constitution clearly adopted the basic political concept of democracy, the actual political content of particular provisions is far from clear.
What is clear is that the framers did not draft a document
of governance binding private parties to any one political view
of property. Nor did they provide for absolute or near absolute
protection of property lights. To the contrary, the framers were
reacting to the concentration of absolute property rights in a
privileged class and were trying to protect against the sovereign powers that emanate from such rights. 104 A cursory exSee supra notes 42-43 and accompanying texi.. But cf. Sagoff, Reason and
Rationality, supra note 83, at 290-91 (associating Madison with the republican
view, perhaps because of his position on federaJ/state relations). For a thoughtful
examination of the Madisoniru1 camp, see NEDEIBKY, supra note 43.
101.
Anderson, supra note 42, at 531-33.
102.
ld. at 534.
103.
See id.
104.
This reaction may explain the rejection of a federalist proposal to restrict
100.
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amination of other key property provisions in the Constitution
demonstrates this point. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution prohibit government deprivations of
property without due process of law. 105 The clear implication
of the due process guarantee is that the framers anticipated
lawful government deprivations of property, authorizing them
as long as due process was provided. An absolutist view of
property generally ignores the distinction between legitimate
due process deprivations of property and compensable takings.
Furthermore, in drafting the Constitution, the framers
relied on some basic common law concepts that involved a
public interest dimension. One of those concepts-private
property106-had already evolved by the time of drafting to
the point where a public interest perspective had become bound
up with property rights. Early land distribution laws, for example, regularly imposed public interest conditions on private
parties applying for land grants. 107 By the 1600s, English
common law had begun to recognize a public interest in certain
critical tidal resources. 108 American courts would eventually
rely on that interest to develop a doctrine that imposed limitations on both government and the private waterfront landowner.109 Consistent with this public interest perspective on property, government traditionally exercised wide latitude in reguthe election of one house of the legislature to the propertied class. See generally id.
at 532-34 (discussing the federalist proposal, as well as Franklin's response to a
similar proposal for the Pennsylvania Constitution). During the colonial period, the
Crown had attempted to maintain control of the social, political, and economic
structure of the colonies in part through their land grant systems. See, e.g., BUTLER & LIVINGSTON, supra note 14, § 8.1 (discussing the land grant system and
policies of colonial Virginia).
For a discussion of the "sovereignty function" of property, see C. Edwin Baker,
Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
741, 769-74 (1986).
105.
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
106.
The Supreme Court generally looks to state law to define property when
evaluating takings claims. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470, 518-19 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,
449 u.s. 155, 161 (1980).
Laws governing the distribution of private interests in land historically
107.
were used to promote a variety of public policies. See, e.g., BUTLER & LMNGSTON,
supra note 14, ch. 8 (discussing the provisions and policies of land distribution
laws enacted in Virginia during the colonial and early statehood periods).
108.
See id. § 5.1.B (discussing the English law origins of the public trust doctrine).
109.
See id. § 5.2 (discussing the emergence of the public trust doctrine in
American courts).
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lating property. 110 Though this perspective may not be as evident today, perhaps because of the discontinuance of the land
grant process,111 the public interest perspective nevertheless
remains bound up with the private property concept. 112
Traditional land use expectations thus ignore some important political theory perspectives. In drafting the Constitution,
the framers were trying to ensure freedom of political thought
and action. One device used to achieve this goal was the concept of constitutionally protected property. Interpreting that
device as impliedly adopting any one political view of our constitutional democracy would undermine the goal of political
freedom. Such an interpretation would also require an insight
into the framers~ state of mind and their drafting
process-which is virtually impossible to obtain. Though many
different political views for interpreting constitutional provisions exist, the Constitution can only realistically be seen as a
political compromise intended to promote a wide range of
views. Such a compromise requires a holistic approach to defining private land use exp,3ctations.
Nor should the concept of constitutionally protected property be interpreted as excluding a public interest component. The
constitutional concept of property depends in large part on the
common law concept of property, which long ago developed a
public interest dimension. Although reasonable people may
debate the extent of this dimension, its existence makes sense
from political theory perspectives. 113 To the extent that private property rights are supposed to serve political values, it
seems logical to recognh~e public interests in private resources
to promote those values when the private system fails to do
so. 114 Though it may be difficult to reach a consensus on
110.
111.

See Anderson, supra note 42, at 537.
Virginia, for example, effectively abolished the land grant system in 1952.
BUTLER & LIVINGSTON, supra note 14, § 8.4, at 283.
112.
The public interest in ce·rtain tidal resources, for example, still remains an
important restriction on private waterfront landowners. See, e.g., id. § 5.2.C (discussing the extent to which pul:,lic trust rights infringe on private rights). A related concept, the commons concept, also recognizes the public interest in certain
coastal resources and poses prc·blems for waterfront landowners in some jurisdictions. See generally id. ch. 6 (discussing the development of the commons concept
in England and Virginia); in.fra note 145 (discussing ( ommon law grounds for limiting private property to promote the public interest).
113.
For further discussion of the political justifications for public rights, see
Lynda L. Butler, En.viron.mental Water Rights: An Evolving Concept of Public Property, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 323, 363-65, 372-74 (1990).
114.
For sources discussing the political importance of private property rights,
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when these failures exist, some of the more compelling cases
arguably can be identified. 115 A public interest in private
property, for example, may deserve recognition when use of the
private property is threatening a common resource and that resource is so vital that public interest recognition is needed to
preserve order and maintain our democratic system of government. Or a public interest limiting private property rights may
merit recognition when private use interferes with a resource
that is closely linked to fundamental political rights-much like
the public interest in navigable waters merits protection
against interference by private waterfront landowners because
of the interest's link to the right to travel. 116 Recognition of
the public interest in private land use, in other words, may become necessary under political theory perspectives when the
private property system fails to allocate interests in resources
consistent with fundamental political ideology. Such recognition
would serve an important legitimating function-legitimating
government action taken to promote the public interest in private land use. 117

3. Ecological perspectives
Ecological perspectives also suggest that the traditional
expectation of exploitative use is no longer viable or reasonable.
As explained earlier, American society traditionally viewed
land as an economic resource-a commodity to be exchanged in
the marketplace.118 Current scientific understandings of our
ecosystem clearly indicate that this view is myopic. Besides
limiting the scope of land use decisions to the physical boundaries of privately owned land, the traditional view also ignores
the ecological value of land. 119 Proponents of economic theory

see id. at 363 n.199.
For a discussion of political justifications for public rights in instream uses,
115.
see id. at 372-74.
116.
For further explanation of the political justifications for a public interest in
navigation that limits private waterfront landowners, see id. at 372.
117.
For further discussion of this legitimating function, see Butler, supra note
6, at 857-58.
118.
See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
See David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for
119.
Judicial Protection of the Public's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 332-36 (1988) (critiquing the traditional view from an
ecological perspective). See generally LYNTON K. CALDWELL, ENVIRONMENT: A CHALLENGE FOR MODERN SOCIETY 65-68, 80-87 (1970) (arguing for a holistic approach to
environmental problems). For a discussion of environmental valuation, see PEARCE
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generally recognize the need to consider costs and benefits in
making resource allocation decisions. Yet, in applying this
principle to private land use choices, many seem to focus only
on traditional economic :factors having an established exchange
value in the marketplace. The ecological value of land is left
out of the traditional land use equation. 120
In opposing government's efforts to incorporate current
scientific understandings into land use laws, private landowners typically argue that changes in land use laws improperly
disrupt settled expectations in violation of constitutionally
protected property rights and that the laws unfairly force them
to bear the burdens of public programs. Although these arguments have some appeal given the private economic effects and
the public benefits of land use laws, ~ the arguments fail to
recognize the scientific motivations for environmental regulation of land use. In addition to being driven by general public
sentiment, ecological usH restrictions reflect growing scientific
knowledge about the link between land use and the environment. 122 As scientific evidence of the interdependence of
natural resources increases, legal recognition of the public
interest in privately ow:qed land becomes inevitable.
Although private landowners may indeed bear some of the
burdens of environmental programs adopted by the majority,
the indiscriminate effects of private land use on common environmental resources are forcing the majority to adopt these
programs. Though individual landowners' expectations of gain
may indeed· be upset, the social injustice of a tragedy of the
commons seems far more compelling. If the problem of the
commons is not rectified, it will eventually bring "ruin to
all."123 The "tragedy of the commons, in its fully disastrous
form, [admittedly] requires a political paralysis that prevents
government from stopping the destruction of a resource."124
The continuing vitality of the traditional expectation of exploitative use and the hostile national political climate surrounding
environmental programs125 suggest that this paralysis may
1 1

& TuRNER, supra note 58, at 120-58, 320-41.
For further criticism of economic perspectives on environmental problems,
120.
see Sagoff, supra note 58.
121.
For further discussion of these two factors, see infra notes 145-57 and accompanying text.
122. See Hunter, supra note 119, at 313-15.
123.
Hardin, supra note 63, at 1244.
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 59, at 187.
124.
125.
Signs of this hostile political climate include the regulatory moratorium
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already exist in the area of environmental regulation of land
use. Because the Lucas decision relies in large part on traditiona! expectations and understandings of property owners, this
paralysis appears, at the very least, to be reinforced by current
takings law. Now more than ever, ecological necessity compels
environmental regulation of land use. 126
The economic, political, and scientific failures of the traditional approach to private property collectively suggest the
need to recognize the public interest in privately owned land
and to impose a social obligation on private landowners. This
social obligation would force private landowners to bear some
responsibility to society for the adverse effects of private land
use decisions. As the economic, political, and scientific perspectives suggest, it is only through the imposition of such an obligation or duty that the law will correct the short-term, selfinterested perspective of private landowners. The nature and
content of the obligation would .be defined by the democratic
political process, 127 through the adoption of environmental
and land use laws, and by the courts, through the reinterpretation of takings and property principles. Inherent in the concept
of recognizing a social obligation is the principle of legitimation; because landowners would bear a general obligation to
account for some of the adverse effects of their land use decisions, government action taken to promote the public interest
and enforce the obligation generally would be legitimated by recognition of the social obligation. 128 Whether the constitutional
concept of property would permit the imposition of a social
obligation on landowners is a question considered in the next
section.

imposed by President Bush on federal regulations, see 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1289
(Aug. 28, 1992); 22 id. at 2364-66 (Feb. 14, 1992); 22 id. at 2171-72 (Jan. 24,
1992), and the activities of Quayle's Council on Competitiveness, see 22 id. at
1969-70 (Dec. 13, 1991); 22 id. at 1820-21, 1837-38 (Nov. 29, 1991); 22 id. at 178788 (Nov. 22, 1991).
Hardin advances the ecological necessity argument as forcefully as any
126.
scholar. See Hardin, supra note 63.
For a discussion of the need to make environmental decisions through the
127.
democratic political process, see Daniel A. Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's
Theorem, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 337.
128.
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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B. Defining the Reasonable Expectations
of Constitutionally Protected Property
Consistent with the Constitution's reliance on preexisting
law, courts and commentators have recognized that the concept
of constitutionally protected property is governed in part by
state law. Defining the reasonable expectations of constitutionally protected property therefore requires some consideration of
common law principles of property law. 129 Two perspectives of
the common law merit attention: first, the private law perspective found in property disputes between private parties; and
second, the public law perspective arising in conflicts between
public and private parties. 130 The premise for resolving disputes under both perspectives is the well-accepted proposition
that property rights are, by definition, a product of the legal
system.131

1. The private law perspective
Several overriding guidelines for defining the reasonable
expectations of constitutionally protected property emerge from
the common law principles governing property disputes between private parties. One guideline concerns the relational
approach to property that developed at common law. Under
that approach, property rights sometimes vary according to the
facts and circumstances surrounding conflicting private
claims. 132 One obvious example under the common law is the
"finders principle," which gives a finder superior rights as
against everyone but the true owner. Under this principle, a
fmder would prevail against a subsequent possessor of the lost
property but would lose to the true owner if she returned to
claim the property. 133

129.
See supra note 106 and accompanying text. See generally Frank I.
Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097'
(1981) (discussing different methods of defining constitutionally protected property).
130.
Neither perspective is entirely exclusive of the other. No private land matter, for example, can be purely private since decisions shape public choices and
values. Conversely, government ]and use restrictions are often imposed to protect
established private uses from other potentially conflicting private uses.
See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead:
131.
Property, Succession, and Society, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 340, 341-42.
See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 68, §§ 1.2-.3 (discussing the relational
132.
n&ture of property rights).
See generally RAY A. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 3.1, 3.5
133.

629]

PRIVATE LAND USE

659

Another example concerns the common law reasonable use
rule governing water use by waterfront landowners in many
eastern jurisdictions.134 Such a landowner, known as a riparian proprietor, generally has the right to make reasonable use
of a watercourse located adjacent to his waterfront property,
but that right is subject to a similar correlative right existing
in other riparians along the same watercourse. 135 Whether a
use is reasonable depends on the facts and circumstances of a
situation; a use that once was reasonable may become unreasonable over time as conditions change. 136 Some of the factors
affecting the reasonableness of a use include normal and current stream conditions, weather conditions, the purpose of the
use, the quantity o:£ water required by the use, and that use's
compatibility with other uses.137 Thus, for example, reasonable uses conducted when water levels are normal may become
unreasonable during periods of low flow. Further, the reasonableness of a use will vary according to a riparian's location
along a watercourse; a riparian may hf;!ve superior use rights
as against riparians below him and inferior interests as against
riparians above him. 138 Like the finders principle, then, the
reasonable use rule does not define private property rights
absolutely or constantly, but rather varies the rights according
to the nature of other conflicting private interests.
A second guideline concerns the common law approach to
defining a property owner's reasonable expectation of gain.
Under the common law, property ownership includes the right
to a reasonable expectation of gain, known traditionally as the
right to make a livelihood, and more recently as the right to
take economic gambles. 139 The existence of this right does not
guarantee, however, that the gamble will pay off. The property
owner does not have a legally protected right guaranteeing her
a return on her investment; unilateral participation in the
marketplace is not a sufficient basis for recognizing a property
(3d ed. 1975) (discussing the rights of finders of lost goods).
See generally Butler, supra note 28 (discussing the reasonable use rule and
134.
other common law principles still governing water use in many eastern states).
Id. at 105-07.
135.
136.
Id. at 130.
137.
Id. at 126.
See id. at 106-07, 126-27. For further discussion of the reasonable use rule
138.
and for suggestions for change, see id. at 125-37.
See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918);
139.
Keeble v. Hickeringill, 88 Eng. Rep. 945 (Q.B. 1707); Kehle v. Hickeringell, 25 Eng.
Rep. 610 (Q.B. 1707); Friedman, supra note 131, at 345.
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right in the anticipated return. Though the law protects property owners from unfair competition, it generally does not protect
them from fair competitive practices, not even when the losing
owners were first-in-time or when the practices caused property owners to lose their entire investment. 140
A third guideline involves the judiciary's power to change
common law rules. Though some courts are reluctant to overturn common law rules, especially when private parties have
r1alied on those rules, the courts generally have recognized their
power to change rules that no longer make sense. The New
l\tfexico judiciary, for example, declared that it would not adopt
common law rules that did not apply to current conditions and
circumstances and had "reached a point of obsolescence."141
The court explained that adherence to property rules which
have "no justification or support in modern society'' would be a
"'revolting'" form of" 'blind imitation.' "142 A California court
went even further, deciding to retroactively reject a common
law rule that had app~ied under its state law. In determining
that retroactive application was appropriate, the court balanced
"the injustice which would result from . . . [following the old
rule] against the injustice, if any, which might result by failing
to give effect to reliance on the old rule and the policy against
disturbing settled" rights.. 143
These guidelines establish a common law basis for limiting
property rights in disputes between private parties and demonstrate that property rights are relative as between private
parties. Under the first guideline the concept of property becomes, in effect, a set of relations which vary over time. Because of those relations, property rights never are totally absolute or predictable. Under the second guideline the property
concept incorporates the notion of economic gambles-that is,
the idea that property owners generally accept the risks of
uncertainty and change in the marketplace. Finally, the third
guideline demonstrates that the property concept includes the
notion of principled changes in common law rules. Because the

140.
For the Supreme Court's attempt to defme unfair competition, see International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236-46 (1918).
141.
Abo Petroleum Corp. v. Amstutz, 600 P.2d 278, 280 (N.M. 1979).
Id. at 281 (quoting Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L.
142.
REV. 457, 469 (1897)). In the court's view, the doctrine of destructibility of contingent remainders met this standard.
143.
Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, Pacifica, 498 P.2d 987, 991
(Cal. 1972) (footnote omitted).
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three guidelines all address the basic nature of common law
property rights, the guidelines should apply to disputes involving constitutionally protected property. As the Supreme Court
concluded in Lucas, a regulation eliminating all economically
viable use would constitute a taking unless the regulation was
based on limitations inherent in the landowner's title or in
background principles of a state's property or nuisance law. 144
As part of the background principles of property law, the three
guidelines establish ways to limit private property rights that
are inherent in those rights. Lucas suggests the possibility of
applying similar notions of relativity to constitutionally protected property.

2. The public law perspective
Earlier discussions of private land use expectations and
property disputes between private parties offer justifications for
recognizing the public interest in private land use. The discussion of private land use expectations suggests that the exploitative view of property has serious economic, political, and ecological shortcomings which justify recognition of the public
interest in privately owned land. By recognizing the public
interest in appropriate private land use contexts, the law could
correct some of these shortcomings. The discussion of the law
governing property disputes between private parties demonstrates a common law basis for limiting private property and
suggests that, contrary to the implications of the absolute use
expectation, the relativity concept generally governs such property disputes. 145 The key inquiry in defining the reasonable
144.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 (1992).
145.
The common law also provides some grounds for limiting private property
rights for the purpose of promoting the public interest. Long ago the courts began
to recognize and protect public rights in certain valuable resources, sometimes even
when the resources were privately owned. See generally BUTLER & LMNGSTON,
supra note 14, chs. 5, 6 (discussing two public rights theories: the "public trust
doctrine" and the "commons concept"). Although the doctrine used to promote the
public interest varies according to the factual and jurisdictional context, the notion
of subordinating private property rights to certain public interests is not foreign to
the common law. For examples of such subordination, see id. § 20.2, at 750·57.
Indeed, at least in the context of navigable waters, the public interest has achieved
constitutional stature. As the Supreme Court explained years ago, navigable waterways are essential to commerce and thus, under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, are impressed with a navigable servitude in the public that generally is
superior to the property rights of waterfront landowners. See United States v.
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 404-05 (1940); Lewis Blue Point Oyster
Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 87 (1913); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
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expectations of constitutionally protected property thus becomes whether the constitutional implications of the property
concept necessitate protection of the traditional expectation of
exploitative use despite its current problems and limitations.
Two aspects of modem land use laws appear, at least on
the surface, to be particularly troubling under constitutional
principles: the laws' economic impact on private landowners
and the laws' creation or promotion of a public benefit. Proponents of the exploitative view generally believe that landowners
should receive compensation for economic loss caused by government regulation of land use. Advocates of this view apparently reason that the concept of constitutionally protected property includes economic expectations formed under earlier laws.
They also believe that the creation of a public benefit at a
landowner's expense is at the core of the Takings Clause and
that under the clause government must pay to achieve such a
1oublic benefit. 146 Both aspects must be evaluated before the
reasonable expectations. of constitutionally protected property
can be properly defined.
Because adverse economic impact results from virtually all
land use regulations, a takings standard based primarily on the
existence of economic harm would be troubling. Such a standard would invalidate most, if not all, land use regulations
enacted without payment of just compensation and would make
environmental preservation and resource management programs costly propositions. A taking3 standard based in part on
the degree of harm to reasonable economic expectations would
be far less troubling. 147 Under such a standard, courts would

Wheat.) 1, 190, 197 (1824). Thus, to the extent that common law principles are
important in deflning constitutionally protected property, those principles suggest
that, in certain resource contexts, the absolute use expectation is unreasonable.
146. · Both factors were involved in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112
S. Ct. 2886 (1992). In Lucas, a waterfront landowner argued that an environmental
regulation prohibiting new construction on his beachfront property constituted a
taking because the regulation deprived him of all economically viable use. The
landowner also argued that the coastal law was enacted to promote public beneflts
like tourism and public beach use, not to prevent public harm. See 60 U.S.L.W.
3609 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1992) (summarizing oral arguments before the Court).
147.
Traditional case law supports the focus on degree, as opposed to existence,
of economic harm. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). A takings
standard that focused solely on the degr!!e of economic harm, however, would also
be troubling. For a discussion of some reasons why, see supra notes 56-67, 85-95
and accompanying text.
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examine the degree of economic harm, along with other traditional takings factors. These factors may include the reasonableness of the affected landowner's expectation of gain and the
nature and importance of the government interest. 148 Though
the case for payment of just compensation would be far more
compelling when a regulation deprives a landowner of all economically viable use, even a total or near total economic loss
might be upheld if a regulated use raises serious public health,
welfare, or safety concerns or constitutes a nuisance. 149
Most land use laws, however, do not deprive landowners of
all economically viable use and thus present more difficult
cases. To the extent that these laws make partial readjustments of economic values and interests between public and
private parties, the economic perspectives discussed earlier
suggest that the readjustments are, as a general proposition,
legitimate. Forcing private landowners to internalize more of
the costs of private land use should not, in the abstract, require
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Supreme Court used a takings
test that focuses almost exclusively on the degree of economic harm when government action causes a futal deprivation of economically viable use. The only inquiry
permitted in such a situation is to determine whether the government action is
based on limitations that inhere in the landowner's title or in property or nuisance
law. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899-900, 2901-02 (1992).
148.
When government action totally deprives a landowner of all economically
viable use, the Supreme Court does not appear to permit consideration of the nature of the government interest. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the
Court concluded that such a situation merited "categorical treatment" as a taking
and ruled out "case-specific inquiry infu the public interest advanced in support of
the restraint." 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992). The Court, however, suggested that
government could be absolved of liability for a compensable taking if it acted to
"forestall . . . wave threats to the lives and property of others." Id. at 2900 n.16
(citing Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18-19 (1880)).
149.
See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623 (1887). But cf. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct.
2886, 2897-99 (1992) (describing Hadacheck, Mugler, and other cases using " 'harmful or noxious use' analysis " as early attempts to develop takings theory and as
inappropriate tools for resolving total deprivation cases). Even in the recent decision Lucas v. South Carolina · Coastal Council, the Court appears to recognize the
possibility of total deprivation cases that do not require compensation because of
serious health, welfare, or safety concerns. See id. at 2900 n.16 (suggesting that
government may be absolved of liability in total deprivation cases if government
acted to "forestall . . . grave threats to the lives and property of others").
The Supreme Court appears to have recognized a landowner's constitutionally
protected right to make a reasonable return on his property. See Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31, 136 (1978). This article is not
considering the validity or desirability of that position; rather the article seeks to
demonstrate the legitimacy of changes in rules of law made without payment of
just compensation to affected property owners under general takings and property
principles.
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compensation. Mter all, those costs are generally attributable
to private landowners, a.nd, to the extent that the costs diminish the value of common resources, private land use impairs
third party interests. Thus, land use regulations that do not
deprive a landowner of all economically viable use generally
should be viewed as reasonable accommodations of private and
public interests under the Takings Clause when the regulations
are forcing the internalization of private land use costs and are
not singling out a particular landowner, as opposed to a particular type of land use, to bear a disproportionate amount of
those costs.
Ecological and political perspectives also support the general legitimacy of partial economic adjustments caused by environmental regulation of land use. Under ecological and political
perspectives, a land us~e regulation that attempts to correct
some of the scientific failures of the private property system
should at least be legitimate when the regulation does not
deprive a landowner of all economically viable use. Constitutional protection of scientifically inaccurate interests like the
absolute use expectation makes little sense when the appropriate corrective government action would not deprive a property
owner of all economic use and would not unfairly single out a
particular landowner. As we learn more about this world, we
should be able to incorporate that knowledge into laws without
having to compensate for every adverse economic impact. Scientific knowledge provides an objective basis for redefining
private property rights and thus minimizes many of the fears
about arbitrary majoritarian exploitation underlying the Takings Clause. 150
Furthermore, given the serious ramifications of the problem of resource scarcity/51 scientific perspectives also suggest
that ecologically necessary land use regulations may, depending on the degree of need, withstand constitutional scrutiny

150.
Some scholars have criticized scientific principles and methodology as giving
a false sense of objectivity and have argued that science is not as value-neutral as
many suggest. See, e.g., Sagoff, Reason and Rationality, supra note 83, at 301-08.
Even accepting the limitations of the scientific method, science still is objective to
the extent that it generates data about and otherwise explains our global ecosystem.
For further discussion of the antimajoritarian basis of the Takings Clause, see
Michelman, supra note 28, at 1214-18.
For further discussion of these ramifications, see Hardin, supra note 63,
151.
and OPHULS, supra note 'Z4.
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even when a landowner is deprived of all economically viable
use. Even the Court in Lucas recognized the possibility of total
deprivation cases that do not require compensation because of
serious public health, welfare, or safety concerns. In explaining
possible justifications .for government action depriving private
property owners of all economically viable use, Justice Scalia
noted that government may be "absolv[ed] . .. of liability for
the destruction of 'real or personal property, in cases of actual
necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire' or to forestall other
grave threats to the lives and property of others."152 Because
of the disastrous consequences of the tragedy of the commons
and because of the overall tenor of the Lucas decision, which
solidifies the paralysis that has slowly overtaken governmental
units attempting to deal with environmental problems,153 the
grave threats exception should be interpreted to include serious
environmental or resource problems. Furthermore, the constitutional reasonableness of private land use expectations should
be determined, in large part, from the facts, conditions, and circumstances existing at the time a land use decision is actually
made, and not at the time of purchase. 154 Such an approach
would be consistent with notions of relativity, which are part of
the background principles of property and which establish the
variability and adaptability of property over time. The law
should not continue to protect private expectations based on
invalid assumptions or obsolete facts and circumstances. Continued protection of inaccurate facts and circumstances would
raise the possibility of ecological and social disaster. ,
Because a public benefit also results from virtually all land
use regulations, the private landowners' reliance on the existence of a public benefit to support their compensation claim is
also misplaced. Indeed, government regulations must produce
some sort of "public benefit" to be valid. Under the Due Process
Clauses of the Constitution, government can generally, exercise
152.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 n.16 (1992)
{quoting Bowdib:h v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18-19 {1880)).
153.
See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
154.
Such an approach would be consistent with Hardin's principle of morality.
See Hardin, supra note 63, at 1245. The suggested approach would, however,
appear to be contrary to the language of some Supreme Court opinions, which
refer to the importance of protecting "investment-backed expectations" under the
Takings Clause. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978). This language suggests that the time of investment (often the time of
purchase) is the key time for evaluating the constitutional validity of private land
use expectations.
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its police power to regulate its citizens and resources if the
resulting law reasonably promotes the public health, welfare,
safety, and morals. 155 1'hus, Justice Scalia's concern in Lucas
over whether "private property is being pressed into some form
of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public
harm"156 provides little guidance in resolving takings cases.
Economic and ecological perspectives suggest that this concern
with the creation of a public benefit is one-sided and simplistic.
.Among other considerations, those focusing on the creation of a
public benefit are ignoring the fact that the public benefit ret1ects a value that the public attaches to common resources
adversely affected by the conduct of private landowners-a
value that the private marketplace does not adequately consider. Forcing private actors in the marketplace to consider that
value seems to be the type of rational economic adjustment
that the law should allow. Additionally, Justice Scalia and
private landowners are ignoring scientific evidence establishing
the detrimental impact of land use on the ecosystem. The
harmful effects of land use have left government with little
choice; government must adopt more stringent environmental
land use regulations if it wants to avoid serious ecological problems. Scientific perspectives thus suggest a more complete view
of environmental regulation of land use; in addition to producing a public benefit, the regulations are minimizing the ecological costs of private land use. Though a public benefit admittedly results, that beneJ5.t cannot help but arise, given the interrelatedness of resources.
A more accurate and more appropriate focus under the
Takings Clause would be to determine whether land use regulations have widespread effect. If the public benefit is created
at the expense of a few landowners who have been singled out
to bear the burdens of a public program, then the takings question is much more troubling. In such a situation, the fear of
majoritarian exploitation of individual property owners be. comes quite real; the few landowners who are affected by the
regulation may legitimately wonder whether government is
trying to "get them." Unless the scope of the regulation can be

155.
See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-88, 395-97
(1926). See generally MANDELKl)R, supra note 2, §§ 2.35-.37 (discussing land use
controls under this traditional due process test).
156.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894-95 (1992).
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explained rationally from a scientific perspective, the regulation would likely fail to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Most land use regulations, however, do not single out a few
landowners, but rather spread out the burdens among broadbased classes of landowners. Political perspectives suggest that
these land use regulations generally should withstand a takings challenge based on the public benefit argument so long as
they result from democratically responsive government. As long
as the burdens are spread out, landowners should not feel like
victims of the majority. Fears of majoritarian exploitation are
minimized when affected landowners can see that eventually
the benefits and burdens of government regulation offset each
other. 157

N . CONCLUSION
In conclusion, economic, political, and ecological perspectives provide a basis for incorporating the concept of relativity
into the definition of constitutionally protected property. These
perspectives are es.pecially important to the modem concept of
constitutionally protected property because they promote the
development of a more holistic view of land use--a view that is
sorely needed in these times of deteriorating and scarce natural
resources. More particularly, the perspectives reveal that the
traditional view of property, especially as reflected in the absolute use expectation, is not a viable approach to defining
private land use rights under constitutional or common law.
Besides ignoring legitimate third party interests in common
resources, the absolute use expectation reflects a view of the
world that is scientifically antiquated and politically one-sided.
By focusing on the failures of the exploitative use expectation, lawmakers have a basis for interpreting constitutionally
protected property rights as relative to the overall economic,
political, and ecological picture. Significantly, this basis would
allow government to recognize the public interest in privately
owned land by adopting regulations to correct some of the failures of the private rights system. Under the public interest
perspective, government would not, as a general proposition,
have to pay just compensation to landowners affected by carefully tailored corrective regulations.

157.

See Michelman, supra note 28, at 1179, 1222-23, 1255.

